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Dubious decision evidence and
criterion flexibility in recognition
memory
Justin Kantner1,2*, Jean M. Vettel1,2 and Michael B. Miller 2
1 U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen, MD, USA, 2 University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
When old–new recognition judgments must be based on ambiguous memory
evidence, a proper criterion for responding “old” can substantially improve accuracy,
but participants are typically suboptimal in their placement of decision criteria.
Various accounts of suboptimal criterion placement have been proposed. The most
parsimonious, however, is that subjects simply over-rely on memory evidence – however
faulty – as a basis for decisions. We tested this account with a novel recognition
paradigm in which old–new discrimination was minimal and critical errors were avoided
by adopting highly liberal or conservative biases. In Experiment 1, criterion shifts were
necessary to adapt to changing target probabilities or, in a “security patrol” scenario, to
avoid either letting dangerous people go free (misses) or harming innocent people (false
alarms). Experiment 2 added a condition in which financial incentives drove criterion
shifts. Critical errors were frequent, similar across sources of motivation, and only
moderately reduced by feedback. In Experiment 3, critical errors were only modestly
reduced in a version of the security patrol with no study phase. These findings indicate
that participants use even transparently non-probative information as an alternative to
heavy reliance on a decision rule, a strategy that precludes optimal criterion placement.
Keywords: recognition, decision making, criterion shifting, response bias, feedback
Introduction
Decision making is often guided by bias, and bias is often adaptive. Indeed, the ability to take the
same action freely in some situations and cautiously in others is essential to decision making in
everyday life. For example, an individual must shift from a more accepting to a more skeptical
stance in evaluating information from more or less reputable sources; a student readily answers
questions while among friends, but is extremely cautious in a classroom setting; a basketball
player passes on a shot while protecting a lead, but not when trying to catch up. Such criterion
shifts – between liberal and conservative standards of evidence for a decision – tailor decision
strategy to the situation and can be essential to avoiding errors, especially when decision evidence
is ambiguous.
Criterion shifting has been of substantial interest in recognition memory (Hockley, 2011), a
task domain well suited to studying the interaction of memory and decision processes. According
to most models of recognition, judgments as to whether a person, place, or object has been
encountered previously are based on whether its appearance elicits a criterial level of memory
evidence (Parks, 1966). One can use (1) a liberal criterion, accepting items as old on the basis
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of relatively little memory evidence, (2) a conservative criterion,
requiring substantial evidence before making an “old” judgment,
or (3) a relatively neutral criterion, favoring neither response.
When memory evidence is ambiguous, context-appropriate
criterion shifting can produce accurate decisions. Consider the
case of meeting a person who strikes us as vaguely familiar: if
the encounter occurs during a vacation, where we would not
expect to see many people we know, we should use a conservative
decision criterion and conclude that the individual is new. If it
occurs in our neighborhood, by contrast, we should be more
likely to conclude that we know the individual.
Despite the adaptive value of criterion shifting for decision
making, recognition memory studies demonstrate that
individuals are limited in their ability (or inclination) to
make such shifts. There is little doubt that participants can
make appropriate shifts under some conditions: provided with
corrective feedback and/or explicit instructions, participants can
adapt bias to within-list changes in the prior probability of an
old item (e.g., Rhodes and Jacoby, 2007; Aminoﬀ et al., 2012)
and the memory strength of old items (Verde and Rotello, 2007;
Singer, 2009). They can also utilize a more liberal criterion for
items tested after a long delay than after a short delay (Singer and
Wixted, 2006), a more conservative criterion when distractors
are highly similar to targets than when they are dissimilar (e.g.,
Benjamin and Bawa, 2004), and a more conservative criterion for
recognizing familiar than unfamiliar scenes (Dobbins and Kroll,
2005). In the absence of feedback or highly salient diﬀerences
between two item classes, however, criterion shifts are generally
not observed (e.g., Rhodes and Jacoby, 2007; Verde and Rotello,
2007). Thus, research has investigated the circumstances that
do versus do not elicit criterion shifts in order to determine the
ﬂexibility of the recognition system to change decision rules.
Although much research has examined the question of when
criterion shifts occur, less is known about why they are often
found to be inadequate to maximize accuracy or expected payoﬀs
(e.g., Ulehla, 1966; Benjamin et al., 2009; Aminoﬀ et al., 2012).
A criterion that maximizes a recognizer’s proportion of correct
responses must be calibrated both to the conditions of the task
and to the individual’s ability to discriminate old items and new
(see Green and Swets, 1966). If participants are told that 70%
of test items are old, for example, an “old” response should
be given whenever the recognizer is unsure; individuals with
lower recognition sensitivity are unsure on a higher proportion
of trials than those with greater sensitivity, and should set more
liberal criteria to improve their percentage of correct responses
[for further discussion of this point see Lynn and Barrett
(2014)]. If old–new discrimination is at chance, for example,
one should respond “old” on every trial, a strategy that would
result in 70% accuracy. Aminoﬀ et al. (2012) tested shifting
between blocks containing 70 and 30% old items and used
each participant’s sensitivity (d’) score to calculate the criterion
with which s/he would maximize proportion correct. Though
they found substantial individual diﬀerences in the magnitude
of shifts, no participant shifted widely enough to maximize
accuracy.
Researchers have advanced several hypotheses regarding the
basis of inadequate criterion shifting (also called “conservatism”).
Ulehla (1966, p. 569) noted that “subjective probability
lags behind objective probability” in some choice domains
and proposed that participants in signal detection tasks
over/underestimate target base rates. Parks (1966) noted that a
strategy of distributing “old” and “new” responses according to
the base rates (i.e., “probability matching”) produced insuﬃcient
criterion placement, and Thomas and Legge (1970) reported
data suggesting that participants do use such a strategy (though
subsequent work disfavored probability matching as a full
account of criterion placement; Thomas, 1975; Benjamin et al.,
2009). Kubovy (1977) suggested that suboptimal criterion
placement is driven by incorrect intuition as to the shape
of the target and lure evidence distributions. Benjamin et al.
(2009) presented evidence that trial-by-trial noise in the decision
criterion – a consequence of the eﬀort required to maintain
and shift the criterion – can produce conservatism in criterion
shifting when base rates are manipulated.
Also relevant to the question of inadequate criterion shifting
are general models of criterion placement. According to the
means model (Hintzman, 1994), participants estimate the
mean of the “old” item distribution, perhaps by learning the
average increment in memory strength aﬀorded by study list
presentation, and establish a criterion at a point between this
“old” mean and the mean of a pre-experimentally familiar new-
item distribution. According to the range model (Parducci, 1984),
participants estimate the highest and lowest memory strength
values to be encountered at test, perhaps by assessing the memory
strength of easily recalled old items and new items, respectively,
and establish their criterion between these endpoint values.
Hirshman (1995) tested these two models in addition to one
based on the probability matching strategy described above; his
analyses weighed in favor of the range model. Recently, Lynn and
Barrett (2014) outlined a “utilized” signal detection framework
for modeling optimal criterion placement according to three
environmental factors: target base rates, the costs, and beneﬁts
(ﬁnancial or otherwise) associated with decision outcomes, and
the similarity of targets to lures. According to this model,
suboptimal criterion placement results from a failure to properly
estimate one or more of these variables.
While any of the abovemechanismsmay help explain criterion
placement for a given participant and/or a given criterion
manipulation, an additional hypothesis with considerable
explanatory reach has received relatively little attention. In their
seminal treatment of signal detection theory, Green and Swets
(1966) proposed that participants fail to place suﬃciently extreme
criteria because they are unwilling to abandon the use of decision
evidence, even when that evidence leads to uncertainty. Green
and Swets (1966) described this phenomenon as follows:
“The observer tends to avoid extreme criteria: when the optimal β
is relatively large, his actual criterion is not so high as the optimal
criterion, and when the optimal β is relatively small, his criterion
is not so low as the optimal criterion. Although this pattern is
consistent with studies of decision making under uncertainty which
do not involve ambiguous sensory information, the signiﬁcance of
its appearance here is not totally clear. It may be suspected that
the subject’s natural disinclination to make the same response on
all trials is strengthened by his awareness that the experimenter’s
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principle interest is in a sensory process. He probably ﬁnds it diﬃcult
to believe that he would be performing responsibly if the sensory
distinctions he makes are exactly those that he could make by
removing the earphones in an auditory experiment or by turning
his back on a visual signal. (p. 91)”
As Green and Swets noted, participants are aware that
the experimenter is interested in a sensory process, a fact
that may limit their willingness to abandon sensory/memory
evidence in making judgments. To the extent that participants
prefer to base recognition decisions on their own resolution
of an ambiguous signal rather than defer to a decision rule
(e.g., “When most of the items are old and I am unsure,
I should respond “old”), their criterion will be suboptimal.
This account is a powerful one in that it can be applied to
any of the commonly used criterion manipulations (i.e., base
rates, payoﬀs, instructional motivation). In addition, it avoids
assumptions of potentially taxing mental computations such
as target probabilities, response frequencies, or features of the
distributions that subjects may be unable or disinclined to
perform.
Despite its generality and relative simplicity, the hypothesis
that inadequate criterion shifting is driven by an overreliance
on memory evidence (and a consequent under-reliance on
probative non-memory forms of evidence, such as payoﬀs or base
rates) has gone largely unexamined. The present experiments
were designed to test this hypothesis by assessing the extent
of participants’ reliance on decision evidence in recognition
memory. In a departure from standard recognition procedures,
we tested the eﬀects of three criterion manipulations using an
extremely homogeneous stimulus set that yielded near-zero old-
new discrimination, such that participants could easily perceive
the ambiguity of the memory evidence. The magnitude of
criterion shifts was measured as inverse evidence of reliance on
this dubious memory evidence: to the extent that participants
resist basing decisions on memory evidence, they should follow
the decision rule mandated by the criterion manipulation and
adopt extreme conservative/liberal criteria. To the extent that
they avoid setting extreme criteria, we infer that they are
using transparently non-probative evidence to make recognition
decisions. Across three experiments and three types of criterion
manipulation, our results suggest that the use of such evidence is
frequent and a major inﬂuence on recognition decisions, whether
memory evidence is entirely ambiguous (Experiments 1 and 2) or
altogether absent (Experiment 3).
Experiment 1
The design of Experiment 1 varied from that of standard
recognition memory paradigms in two respects. First, recognition
experiments are typically designed such that participants have
at least moderate old-new discrimination at test. The more
participants are able to use memory evidence to make decisions,
the less they beneﬁt from criterion shifting. Additionally, even
modest levels of discrimination may be suﬃcient for participants
to believe that they can rely onmemory evidence and eschew large
shifts (Aminoﬀ et al., 2012). To create a strong test of participants’
use of memory evidence, we used an extremely homogeneous
stimulus set (described below) in which old and new items are so
similar that discrimination is near chance. Such a transparently
diﬃcult recognition task should lead subjects to place minimal
weight on memory evidence and yield to a decision rule as a basis
for memory decisions.
A second feature of most recognition experiments is that
the impetus for making accurate judgments is simply accuracy
itself, except when ﬁnancial incentives are used (e.g., Healy and
Kubovy, 1978). Perhaps individuals can readily be induced to
limit their use of memory evidence when the recognition task
provides a compelling subjective reason to bias responses. We
created such a task by converting a typical recognition paradigm
into a “security patrol for suspicious persons.” Participants
studied a list of “suspicious” individuals and, at test, were told
to respond “suspicious” to anyone recognized from the study list
and “innocent” to anyone not on the study list. In liberal blocks,
participants were informed that calling an individual “suspicious”
meant pulling that individual aside for questioning and search,
and participants should respond “suspicious” whenever in doubt.
In conservative blocks, calling an individual “suspicious” meant
that they would be subject to “aggressive pursuit, probable
injury, and capture,” and participants should respond “innocent”
whenever unsure. To ensure that criterion shifts were motivated
solely by the shifts in the nature of the patrols, the base rate
of targets was ﬁxed at 0.30 across blocks (a proportion that
produced a minority of suspicious individuals but left enough
target trials to allow reliable estimates of sensitivity and response
criterion). Coupled with the extremely poor discrimination
of suspicious and innocent probes, the importance placed
on avoiding critical errors in the two types of patrols (see
Method for full instructions) should provide an abundance of
incentive to adopt extreme response criteria in both liberal
and conservative blocks, shifting widely between the two
scenarios.
As a comparison condition, we also tested shifting in
a standard target probability manipulation. In the liberal
(conservative) test blocks, 70% (30%) of test items were old;
the stimuli were those used in the security patrol condition, but
no mention of a patrol scenario was made. Each participant
completed both tasks (Percent and Patrol) to enable within-
subjects comparisons of criterion shifting, critical misses, and
critical false alarms across diﬀerent sources of motivation.
Finally, to further motivate criterion shifting, half of the
participants in each group received trial-by-trial feedback at test.
Feedback was tailored to each task (see Method) and not only
conveyed the accuracy of responses but, in the case of errors,
provided persistent reminders of the appropriate bias in a given
test block.
Method
Participants
One hundred twelve undergraduates at the University of
California, Santa Barbara participated for course credit. The
feedback and no feedback conditions included 57 and 55
participants, respectively. All experiments reported in this article
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were approved by the Human Subjects Committee at the
University of California, Santa Barbara.
Materials
Stimuli were 324 full-body human models created with 3ds Max
software (Autodesk, Inc). Each item combined a unique head
model with one of six hairstyles (created with FaceGen, Singular
Inversions Ltd.) and one of eight body models (ES3DStudios)
wearing one of six clothing styles in one of 13 clothing colors.
Thus, each individual had a unique face, but non-face features
overlapped. Half of the models were male.
Each model appeared against a white background for
presentation during study and embedded in a realistic desert
environment (ES3DStudios) for presentation at test. Sixteen
scenes were used; half depicted the center of a city and half
depicted the outskirts. Individual models were centered in
each scene and faced forward. Test probes were presented
against city backgrounds during one type of patrol and against
outskirts backgrounds during the other (counterbalanced across
participants). Thus, the backgrounds provided a visual context
consistent with a liberal “city patrol” and a conservative “outskirts
patrol,” or vice versa. Examples of the stimuli appear in
Figure 1.
Study and test lists for each of two recognition study-test cycles
were created via random selection from the 324-item pool for
each participant. The study list for each cycle was composed
of 70 randomly selected individuals appearing against white
backgrounds. The test lists for each cycle included a randomly
ordered intermix of studied and non-studied individuals, each
appearing against a city or outskirts background. No items were
repeated between the two study-test cycles. The experiment was
conducted with E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools,
Inc., Sharpsburg, PA, USA).
Procedure
Each participant completed two recognition study-test cycles,
one a Percent task (target probability manipulation) and the
other a Patrol task. Half of the participants received trial-by-trial
feedback and half received no feedback. In each task, 70 items
were studied for 2 s each with a 1-s inter-stimulus interval. Tests
were divided into four 35-item blocks that interleaved liberal and
conservative conditions. The assignment of tasks and feedback
conditions to participants, task order, test block order, assignment
of city/outskirts backgrounds to liberal/conservative patrols, and
ordering of the both study and test lists were randomized anew
for each participant.
Patrol Task
Participants were informed that they would be taking part
in a simulated security patrol for suspicious persons and
that they would begin by studying suspicious individuals to
be recognized later. Test instructions informed participants
that they would be presented with a mixture of suspicious
people from the study list and innocent people they had
never seen and that their task was to respond “suspicious”
(by pressing the “1” key) to the former and “innocent” (by
pressing “0”) to the latter. Participants were told that the
nature of the patrol would vary according to the location of
the individuals. For liberal blocks, participants received these
instructions:
“While you are on patrol in the outskirts, identifying an individual
as SUSPICIOUS means that individual will be pulled aside for
questioning and search. It is VERY IMPORTANT not to miss any of
the suspicious people you saw earlier. Those people are potentially
dangerous and need to be questioned and searched. Remember, in
the outskirts, you deﬁnitely do not want tomiss any of the suspicious
people you saw earlier. It’s ﬁne if you mistakenly pull aside some
people for questioning who turn out to be innocent (not seen before).
This is a minor inconvenience for them. But make sure you don’t
miss any of the suspicious people you saw earlier!”
For conservative blocks:
“While you are on patrol in the city, identifying an individual as
SUSPICIOUSmeans that they will be hunted down like a dangerous
criminal. This will include aggressive pursuit, probable injury, and
capture to the people that you identify. It is VERY IMPORTANT not
to mistakenly identify an innocent person as suspicious. It would
be an injustice to subject an innocent person to this treatment.
FIGURE 1 | Examples of stimuli used in the current experiments: female with outskirts background (left) and male with city background (right).
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Remember, in the city, you deﬁnitely do not want to identify
innocent people as suspicious. It’s ﬁne to miss some people who turn
out to be suspicious (that you saw before). It is expected that some
suspicious people will escape capture on this patrol. But make sure
you don’t mistakenly hunt innocent people!”
The eight city and eight outskirts locations were introduced
for 3 s each, accompanied by the type of error to be avoided
(misses in liberal blocks and false alarms in conservative blocks).
Each test block was characterized as a city patrol or an outskirts
patrol. The base rate of old items was 0.30 in each block.
Instructions preceding each block reminded participants of the
crucial importance of avoiding critical misses or false alarms. Test
responses were non-speeded. A blank 2-s interval separated each
trial.
Percent Task
Participants were informed that they would be studying a list of
individuals to memorize. Test instructions explained that city or
outskirts location was diagnostic of probability old. The locations
were introduced alongside the corresponding base rate of old
items. Test blocks were deﬁned by the prior probability of an old
item (70 or 30%). Instructions appeared before each test block
reminding participants of the percentage of old items in that
block and explicitly advising that because most of the individuals
in the block were (were not) on the study list, one should respond
“old” (“new”) whenever unsure.
Feedback
Except for the presence of trial-by-trial feedback at test and
related instructions, the feedback and no feedback versions of the
tasks were identical. Instructions stated that feedback would be
presented after each response and encouraged participants to use
it to improve their decisions. In the Percent task, correct answers
were followed with the phrase “Correct! That individual was/was
not studied!” in a blue font. In the Patrol task, feedback read
“Correct! That individual was suspicious/innocent!” in a blue
font.
Feedback to incorrect responses varied between liberal and
conservative blocks. In liberal blocks, Percent feedback was
“Okay, but that individual was not studied” in a black font
following a false alarm and “Wrong! That individual was studied!
Remember, 70% are OLD!” in a red font following a miss. Patrol
feedback read “Okay, but that individual was innocent” following
a false alarm and “Wrong! That individual was suspicious!
Remember, don’t miss anyone SUSPICIOUS!” following a miss.
Analogous feedback was given in the conservative blocks.
Feedback was presented for 2 s.
Results and Discussion
Recognition sensitivity (d′) was calculated as z(H) – z(FA), where
H and FA are the hit and false alarm rates, respectively. Response
bias was measured with c, equal to –[z(H) + z(FA)]/2. Hit and
false alarm rate values of 0 and 1 were adjusted via Macmillan
and Kaplan’s (1985) method to enable calculation of d′ and c: rates
of 0 were adjusted upward to 0.5/N and rates of 1 were adjusted
downward to 1-(0.5/N), where N is the number of signal trials
(for hit rates) or the number of noise trials (for false alarm rates).
The mean d′ and c-values in each condition appear in Table 1.
As expected, old–new discrimination was very poor. Across the
patrol and percent tasks, the mean d′ for all participants was
0.132 (corresponding to a mean hit rate of 0.51 and a mean
FA rate of 0.46). This value was signiﬁcantly greater than zero,
t(111) = 7.925, p < 0.001, indicating minimal but statistically
above-chance discrimination. d′ data were analyzed with a 2
(Task: Percent vs. Patrol) × 2 (Bias: Liberal vs. Conservative)× 2
(Feedback: Present vs. Absent) mixed factor ANOVA with Task
and Bias as within-subjects factors and Feedback as a between-
subjects factor. d′ scores were modestly but signiﬁcantly higher
during liberal test blocks (M = 0.177) than during conservative
test blocks (M = 0.096), F(1,110) = 8.026, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.068,
but did not vary as a function of task (p = 0.62) or feedback
(p = 0.26). There were no signiﬁcant interactions (all ps > 0.62).
Before comparing criterion shifting between the two tasks in
an ANOVA, we sought evidence of the eﬃcacy of our shifting
manipulations, i.e., that shifts were signiﬁcantly greater than zero
in both the Percent and Patrol tasks. We submitted values of c
in liberal and conservative test blocks to planned paired samples
t-tests for each of the four Task × Feedback pairings (Percent
and Patrol, with and without feedback). Diﬀerences in c between
liberal and conservative blocks were highly signiﬁcant in each
case (all ts > 7, all ps < 0.001).
Mean criterion shifts (cconservative – cliberal) are displayed
as a function of task and feedback condition in Figure 2.
As is evident from the ﬁgure, criterion shifting was robust,
and increased with feedback. A Task × Feedback ANOVA
revealed a main eﬀect of task, F(1,110) = 5.56, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.048, and feedback, F(1,110)= 14.7, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.118,
indicating that participants shifted signiﬁcantly more in the
TABLE 1 | Mean d′ and criterion values in liberal and conservative blocks, Experiment 1.
d′conservative d′liberal cconservative cliberal
M CI95% M CI95% M CI95% M CI95%
Feedback
Patrol 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.64 0.12 −0.19 0.14
Percent 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.11 0.69 0.08 −0.59 0.10
No feedback
Patrol 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.14 −0.46 0.13
Percent 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.27 0.08 −0.34 0.09
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FIGURE 2 | Mean criterion shifts in the feedback and no feedback conditions of the Percent and Patrol tasks in Experiment 1. Error bars represent the
SEM.
Percent task than in the Patrol task, and that feedback increased
shifting across both tasks. The main eﬀect of task, however,
was driven by the feedback condition, reﬂected by a signiﬁcant
Task × Feedback interaction, F(1,110) = 15.9, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.126. Without feedback, shifting was directionally (but
non-signiﬁcantly) greater in the Patrol task, t(54) = 1.42,
p = 0.16, but participants receiving feedback shifted far more in
the Percent task, t(56) = 3.91, p < 0.001.
Criterion shifts, while substantial, were not suﬃcient to
minimize critical errors in the Patrol task (deﬁned as misses in the
liberal condition and false alarms in the conservative condition;
see Figure 3). Without feedback, the critical false alarm and
miss rates were 0.39 and 0.31, respectively, despite the strong
instructional motivation to consider such errors unacceptable.
These error rates were statistically equivalent to those in the
Percent condition (both ps> 0.18). Feedbackmoderately reduced
critical errors in both tasks, with one exception: misses in the
liberal condition were approximately 0.10 higher with feedback
than without. Thus, liberal misses in the feedback condition
were much more frequent in the Patrol than in the Percent
task, t(56) = 6.681, p < 0.001. Conservative false alarms in the
feedback condition were roughly equivalent across the two tasks,
t(56) = 1.606, p = 0.11.
In order to conﬁrm that greater criterion shifts are associated
with reduced critical errors, we calculated the correlation of
shift amount and critical error rates across all Task × Feedback
conditions. Strong relationships were observed between shifting
and critical false alarms, r(223) = −0.65, p < 0.001 and
between shifting and critical misses, r(223) = −0.62, p < 0.001.
The negative direction of these relationships indicates that
participants shifting more between liberal and conservative
blocks committed fewer critical errors.
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that insuﬃcient criterion
placement in recognition memory is not limited tomanipulations
of target probability: in the security patrol scenario, the
avoidance of critical misses and false alarms was described as
imperative, yet both types of errors were committed at high
rates. Indeed, critical error rates in the Patrol task did not
diﬀer from those of the Percent condition, which speciﬁed no
critical errors to be avoided and involved no justiﬁcation for
criterion shifting beyond the target base rates. As expected,
trial-by-trial feedback was generally associated with larger
criterion shifts and a reduction in critical errors. However,
participants receiving feedback still committed such errors
on approximately 25% of trials, and in the liberal condition
of the Patrol task, feedback apparently made participants
more conservative. Even with little or no diagnostic memory
evidence to rely upon, a compelling subjective motivation to
adopt a simple decision rule that would avoid critical errors,
and pointed negative feedback each time such mistakes were
made, participants’ rates of such errors were well above ﬂoor
levels.
Why didn’t participants execute large enough criterion shifts
to prevent critical errors? The ironic eﬀect of feedback in the
liberal blocks of the Patrol task may be revealing. While the base
rate of old items in the Percent task shifted between 70 and 30%,
the probability of a suspicious individual in the Patrol task was
30% throughout the test. As noted above, we chose this base rate
in order to hold suspicious items to a minority of trials, intended
as a realistic feature of a security patrol. However, feedback
likely allowed participants to learn that targets were relatively
uncommon (e.g., Kantner and Lindsay, 2010), countervailing
the instruction to avoid misses in liberal test blocks. That
participants were induced to adopt a more conservative criterion
with feedback suggests that they adapted their criteria to the low
probability of a target, an appropriate strategy for increasing the
overall proportion of correct responses but one contrary to the
central goal of minimizing misses. This possibility is consistent
with work by Maddox and Bohil (1998, 2005) demonstrating that
participants in a perceptual categorization task set suboptimal
criteria when optimality (in maximizing ﬁnancial rewards) is at
cross-purposes with the maximization of accuracy.
Thus, participants appear to have prioritized attempts at
accuracy over the consistent application of a task-relevant
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FIGURE 3 | Critical errors in liberal test blocks (misses, top) and conservative test blocks (false alarms, bottom) across recognition tasks in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent the SEM.
decision rule. An emphasis on accuracy in the liberal Patrol
task would be consistent with hypothesis that participants
fail to discount memory evidence: regardless of the extremely
poor quality of the memory evidence for discriminating old
and new items, participants may have persisted in using such
evidence as a basis for judgments in the hope of discerning the
correct response. As a result, easily avoidable critical errors were
prevalent.
The Patrol task in Experiment 1 was designed to test the limits
of participants’ reliance on memory evidence by producing both
near-zero old–new discrimination and a clear and compelling
subjective valuation on the avoidance of misses or false alarms.
The ﬁnding that criterion shifts in that task were no greater than
in a traditional target probability manipulation suggests a limit
on criterion ﬂexibility common to both tasks. A limitation of
the Patrol task, however, is the lack of a personal consequence
for critical errors. While participants clearly understood the task
and shifted adaptively, they might have been induced to further
constrain the use of memory evidence if they themselves were
aﬀected by their decisions. We tested this possibility by placing
a ﬁnancial consequence on critical errors in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The simulated nature of the Patrol condition in Experiment 1 left
open the possibility that participants overused memory evidence
because the consequences of critical errors were ﬁctional. We
addressed this possibility in Experiment 2 by using asymmetric
payoﬀ schedules to induce criterion shifts (e.g., Healy and
Kubovy, 1978). Participants studied and were tested on the same
materials as in the Percent and Patrol tasks, but with no cover
story or shifts in target probability. Critically, moneywas awarded
for each correct response, while the penalty for errors varied
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to drive either liberal or conservative responding. Experiment 2
also included the Percent and Patrol tasks from Experiment 1.
Due to concerns about the length of the experiment (especially
given the extremely diﬃcult nature of the recognition tests), each
participant completed only two of the three tasks. The question
of interest was whether a personal ﬁnancial incentive would
drive criterion shifts exceeding those of the Percent and Patrol
tasks.
The Payoﬀ condition was also valuable in assessing one
potential explanation for the poor criterion placement observed
in Experiment 1: perhaps participants realized that they
should disregard memory evidence in making their recognition
decisions and that they should instead rely on the most
probable outcome/patrol directive, but chose not to because
such extreme criteria entail a monotonous response pattern
(i.e., nearly all “old” responses in liberal blocks and nearly
all “new” responses in conservative blocks). While the desire
to intermix responses alone would likely not account for
the high rates of critical errors observed in Experiment
1, it is possible that some participants deliberately avoided
extreme criteria for that reason, demonstrating a limit on
criterion ﬂexibility speciﬁc to very low d′ situations (when
d′ is higher, by contrast, optimality does not require extreme
criteria). If so, the Payoﬀ condition should mitigate this
strategy: we expect that few participants would knowingly
sacriﬁce bonus money in exchange for a more varied response
pattern.
Experiment 2 also included a slight modiﬁcation to the Patrol
task, designed to address the unexpected tendency for feedback to
increase the miss rate in the liberal condition. As discussed above,
feedback likely drove this increase by conveying the low base
rate of targets, drawing participants into a conservative guessing
strategy. Eliminating the diagnostic value of the base rate for
guessing correctly, then, should restrict the inﬂuence of feedback
to dissuading misses, reversing its eﬀect in liberal Patrol blocks.
To test this hypothesis, we set the target base rate to 0.50 in each
block of the Patrol task in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Two hundred thirty-four undergraduates at the University of
California, Santa Barbara participated for course credit. The
number of subjects in each of the six groups appears in Table 2.
Materials
Materials were identical to those of Experiment 1.
Procedure
Each participant completed two recognition study-test cycles
corresponding to two of three tasks: Percent, Patrol, and Payoﬀ.
The two tasks to be completed and their order were determined
randomly. The Percent task was identical to that of Experiment 1.
The Patrol task was identical to that of Experiment 1 except
that the base rate of old items was 0.50 (as opposed to 0.30 in
Experiment 1). In the Payoﬀ task, participants were informed that
each correct response they gave would be worth 10 cents, while
the penalty for errors would vary according to the location of the
individuals: in liberal blocks, participants lost 20 cents for a miss
and nothing for a false alarm; in conservative blocks, participants
lost nothing for a miss and 20 cents for a false alarm. The base
rate of old items was 0.50 in each test block. Feedback in the
payoﬀ task was identical to that of the Percent task except for the
TABLE 2 | Mean d′ and criterion in conservative and liberal blocks, criterion shifting, critical false alarms, and misses in Experiment 2.
d′conservative d′ liberal cconservative cliberal Shifting Critical FA Critical miss
M CI95 M CI95 M CI95 M CI95 M CI95 M CI95 M CI95
Feedback
Patrol vs. Payoff (N = 38)
Patrol 0.21 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.19 −0.63 0.18 0.99 0.36 0.35 0.06 0.25 0.04
Payoff 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.74 0.19 −0.87 0.18 1.61 0.43 0.24 0.05 0.20 0.04
Percent vs. Payoff (N = 38)
Percent 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.84 0.17 −1.01 0.20 1.84 0.36 0.21 0.04 0.18 0.04
Payoff 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.97 0.20 −0.95 0.20 1.92 0.39 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.05
Percent vs. Patrol (N = 40)
Percent 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.73 0.15 −0.81 0.18 1.54 0.29 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.03
Patrol 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.43 0.23 −0.82 0.19 1.25 0.40 0.35 0.06 0.22 0.04
No Feedback
Patrol vs. Payoff (N = 44)
Patrol 0.25 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.38 0.19 −0.52 0.19 0.90 0.34 0.34 0.05 0.31 0.05
Payoff 0.15 0.10 0.26 0.13 0.43 0.15 −0.53 0.16 0.95 0.28 0.32 0.05 0.29 0.05
Percent vs. Payoff (N = 39)
Percent 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.45 0.15 −0.53 0.15 0.99 0.28 0.33 0.05 0.29 0.04
Payoff 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.43 0.17 −0.58 0.19 1.00 0.32 0.33 0.05 0.28 0.05
Percent vs. Patrol (N = 35)
Percent 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.34 0.10 −0.37 0.11 0.71 0.17 0.36 0.04 0.36 0.04
Patrol 0.15 0.14 0.26 0.13 0.21 0.16 −0.41 0.20 0.62 0.17 0.41 0.06 0.32 0.06
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addition of the words “+10 cents” following correct responses,
“−20 cents” following critical errors, and “±0 cents” following
non-critical errors.
Results and Discussion
Old–new discrimination was nearly identical to that of
Experiment 1. Across all participants, the mean d′ was 0.146
(corresponding to a mean hit rate of 0.55 and a mean FA rate
of 0.49), a value signiﬁcantly greater than zero, t(233) = 13.772,
p < 0.001. d′ scores did not vary for any of the groups as a
function of task (all ps > 0.17) or across liberal and conservative
test blocks (all ps > 0.32). Feedback did not aﬀect d′ scores in any
of the task pairings (all ps > 0.42).
The means of interest for each group are displayed in Table 2.
Diﬀerences in c-values between liberal and conservative test
blocks were again highly signiﬁcant in each task across all groups
(all ts > 4, all ps < 0.001). One-way ANOVAs revealed no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in criterion values as a function of task
pairing (e.g., values of c were the same in the Percent task across
the Percent vs. Patrol and Percent vs. Payoﬀ groups), all ps> 0.09.
Therefore, to facilitate visual comparisons across tasks, we pooled
the results for each task across groups, creating an overall mean
for each task. Mean criterion shifts are displayed in Figure 4, and
mean critical miss and false alarm rates are displayed in Figure 5.
As is clear from these ﬁgures, criterion shifts were insuﬃcient
to eliminate critical errors, regardless of the task. Trial-by-trial
feedback appeared to reduce critical errors, but not below rates of
approximately 20% across tasks.
Unfortunately, because each participant completed two of the
three tasks, these data do not lend themselves to an omnibus
ANOVA. Therefore, we submitted the results from each of the
six within-subjects task pairings (Patrol vs. Payoﬀ, Percent vs.
Payoﬀ, and Percent vs. Patrol, each with and without feedback)
to paired-samples t-tests with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level
of 0.0167. This alpha level is equal to 0.05/3 and reﬂects the
fact that three t-tests (comparing criterion shifts, critical misses,
and critical false alarms) were conducted for each of the six
groups. We note that this adjusted alpha level did not aﬀect the
signiﬁcance of any t-test result relative to the conventional 0.05
level.
In the absence of feedback, shifting was approximately
equivalent in the Percent, Patrol, and Payoﬀ conditions, yielding
average critical miss and false alarm rates above 30% across tasks.
There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in shifting, critical misses, or
critical false alarms in any of the cross-task comparisons. In the
Percent vs. Patrol group, there was a marginal tendency for lower
critical false alarms in the Percent task, t(34) = 1.871, p = 0.07.
Otherwise, all cross-task comparisons in the Percent vs. Patrol,
Patrol vs. Payoﬀ, and Percent vs. Payoﬀ groups yielded p-values
greater than 0.16 for all dependent measures.
Participants receiving feedback tended to shift criterion less in
the Patrol condition than in the Percent and Payoﬀ conditions.
In the Patrol vs. Payoﬀ group, shifting was signiﬁcantly greater in
the Payoﬀ task, t(37) = 3.337, p < 0.01. In the Percent vs. Patrol
group, shifting was directionally but not signiﬁcantly greater in
the Percent task, t(39) = 1.490, p = 0.14. Shift magnitudes were
roughly equivalent across the Percent and Payoﬀ tasks, evidenced
by a non-signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the Percent vs. Payoﬀ group,
p = 0.73.
The decreased shifting in the Patrol task was accompanied by
a corresponding increase in critical errors in that task relative
to the Percent and Payoﬀ tasks. In the Patrol vs. Payoﬀ group,
critical false alarms were signiﬁcantly lower in the Payoﬀ task,
t(37) = 3.581, p < 0.001, while critical misses were directionally
but non-signiﬁcantly lower, t(37) = 1.549, p = 0.13. In the
Percent vs. Patrol group, critical false alarms were signiﬁcantly
lower in the Percent task, t(39) = 4.072, p < 0.001, but critical
misses did not diﬀer (p = 0.35). Neither critical false alarms
FIGURE 4 | Mean criterion shifts in the feedback and no feedback conditions of the Percent, Patrol, and Payoff tasks in Experiment 2. Error bars
represent the SEM.
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FIGURE 5 | Critical misses (top) and false alarms (bottom) across recognition tasks in Experiment 2. Error bars represent the SEM.
nor critical misses diﬀered across tasks in the Percent vs. Payoﬀ
group, both ps > 0.27.
The results of Experiment 2 were straightforward: whether
the motivation for criterion shifts was the avoidance of critical
errors in a security patrol scenario, accumulation of money,
or knowledge of uneven base rates, criterion placement was
incommensurate with participants’ ﬂoor-level discrimination and
insuﬃcient to prevent high rates of costly errors. Moreover,
shifting magnitudes were generally equivalent across the three
tasks, resonant with the results of Experiment 1 in suggesting
a limit to criterion ﬂexibility that is robust across diﬀerent
contextual manipulations of bias. In particular, the fact that
response criteria were generally no more extreme when money
was at stake than when it was not suggests that inadequate
criterion setting is not simply a result of participants wishing to
avoid making the same response on most trials. It seems unlikely
that a substantial number would have given up money to do
so, especially to the extent evidenced by the critical error rates.
Finally, changing the proportion of suspicious items in the Patrol
task to 0.50 reversed the negative eﬀect of feedback on critical
misses observed in Experiment 1, when the prior probability was
0.30. This result supports the proposal that participants will seek
out and use any information they believe can help them discern
old–new status, even when doing so runs counter to the primary
objective of the task.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that limited criterion
ﬂexibility in recognition memory stems from a failure to discount
memory evidence as a basis for decisions, even when memory
evidence is completely ambiguous. In Experiment 3, we tested
a scenario in which memory evidence was completely absent.
Each participant completed two security patrol tasks, one of
which did not include a study phase. In order to provide a
reasonable context for a study-free recognition test, participants
were told that while they would normally be studying pictures
of suspicious individuals en route to the security patrol, their
equipment malfunctioned, and they would have to complete
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the patrol without having studied the suspicious individuals
(see Method for full instructions). In this security patrol, then,
participants were fully aware that memory evidence was non-
existent. If dependence onmemory evidence restricts appropriate
criterion shifting, then shifting in the study-free patrol should be
greater than previously observed.
Our study phase-free recognition procedure is very similar
to one developed by Healy and Kubovy (1978), who sought to
test the hypothesis that suboptimal criterion placement arises
from the memory demands of a recognition study/test procedure
limiting participants’ ability to track the number of old items
presented at test. In their “no memory” condition, participants
received lines of dashes in place of to-be-recognized items in the
study phase, followed by a standard recognition test. Participants
were told that there would be correct and incorrect answers on
the test, but that they would have no memory information on
which to base their judgments. As in our Percent condition,
participants were informed of the base rates of old items,
which shifted across blocks. Healy and Kubovy (1978) compared
criterion shifts in this no-memory condition with shifts in a
condition containing a standard study phase and found that
shifting was directionally but not signiﬁcantly greater in the
no-memory condition. As criterion shifts were still suboptimal
in the absence of a study list, the authors interpreted these
results as evidence against both the memory load hypothesis
(because no items were memorized) and the hypothesis that
under-shifting is driven by a failure to appreciate the distributions
of old and new items (because there were no truly “old”
items).
Although we used a study list-free procedure to assess a
diﬀerent hypothesis (i.e., that overreliance on memory evidence
restricts criterion placement), Healy and Kubovy’s (1978) results
suggest that participants are hard-pressed to use extreme criteria
even in the absence of memory evidence. Participants may, then,
embrace some other form of non-probative, internally generated
decision evidence when no memory evidence is available.
Although it is unclear what form this alternative evidence would
take (and it may indeed be somewhat idiosyncratic), Healy
and Kubovy’s (1978) results indicate that it may prevail over
the consistent use of an adaptive criterion. The comparison
of shifting in the study phase-free and standard Patrol tasks
in Experiment 3 served as a test of this possibility. The use
of more extreme criteria in the study phase-free patrol than
the standard patrol would suggest the limiting inﬂuence of
memory evidence overuse; if the two conditions elicit similar
criteria (as in Healy and Kubovy’s data), other forms of
dubious decision evidence would be implicated in poor criterion
placement.
Although the lack of an encoding phase eliminates
any possibility of basing decisions on memory evidence,
participants might base suspicious/innocent judgments on
physical characteristics of the stimuli. While no such stimulus
features were in fact predictive of suspicious/innocent status,
participants lacking an alternative basis for judgments might
infer that certain items “look” suspicious (e.g., those wearing
dark clothing), essentially treating the study-free patrol as a
categorization task. To help ensure that the nature of the patrol
(i.e., avoid misses or avoid false alarms) was considered the only
potential basis for judgments, instructions informed participants
that characteristics such as gender, skin color, clothing color,
body posture, and facial expression “do not tell you anything
about whether an individual is more likely to be suspicious”
and that the nature of the patrol was the only basis for making
judgments.
Method
Participants
Ninety-one undergraduates at the University of California, Santa
Barbara participated for course credit. Forty-nine completed the
study-test cycle ﬁrst, followed by the test with no prior study
phase; the remaining 42 completed the tasks in the reverse order.
Materials
Materials were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2. The
assignment of suspicious vs. innocent status to test probes in the
study-free patrol was functionally random for each participant.
Procedure
Participants completed two Patrol tests, one with a preceding
study phase and one without, in a random order. Instructions
were similar to those used in the Patrol task of the two previous
experiments, but were adapted to provide context for the study-
free patrol:
“You are currently riding in a car on the way to the security
patrol. While you are on the way, you are supposed to be presented
with pictures of suspicious individuals, because when you reach the
security patrol, you are tested on your memory for these suspicious
individuals. But there has been a problem on the way to the patrol.
You were supposed to study a list of the suspicious people that you
will encounter on the patrol, but your equipment malfunctioned,
and you were not able to study any of these individuals before
getting to the patrol.
However, you must still complete the patrol.
You will encounter individuals that are either suspicious or
innocent, and youmust decide whether each individual is suspicious
or innocent, even though you did not get the chance to study the
suspicious ones.”
Prior to the start of the test, participants received the following
information (not included in Experiments 1 and 2):
“One piece of advice for these patrols: you will not be able to tell
whether an individual is suspicious or innocent based on their
gender, skin color, clothing color, body posture, or facial expression.
These features do not tell you anything about whether an individual
is more likely to be suspicious or more likely to be innocent.
And because of your equipment malfunction, you did not have a
chance to study the suspicious individuals earlier. The only reliable
information you have in making your judgments is the knowledge
of what kind of patrol you are on (city or outskirts).”
Instructions for the standard security patrol diﬀered from
the above in only two respects. First, no equipment failure
was mentioned and the study phase proceeded as normal.
Second, the advice given to participants prior to the test
concluded with the statement “The only reliable information
you have in making your judgments is whether or not
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you studied the individual on the way to the patrol, and
the knowledge of what kind of patrol you are on (city or
outskirts).”
In order to reduce the amount of instructional material to
be read by participants, descriptions of the city and outskirts
patrols appeared only before each type of patrol was to begin; an
earlier overview included in Experiments 1 and 2 was omitted.
The viewing of the city and outskirts backgrounds prior to the
test was also omitted. The test procedure was identical to that
of Experiments 1 and 2, except that no participants were given
feedback.
Results and Discussion
The mean d′ and c-values in each condition appear in
Table 3. As would be expected given the lack of an encoding
phase, discrimination of suspicious and innocent items was
approximately zero in the study-free patrol (mean d′ = 0.013)
and not signiﬁcantly greater than chance, p = 0.59. d′ scores in
the standard patrol were comparable to those of Experiments 1
and 2 (M = 0.179), and were again signiﬁcantly greater than
zero, t(90) = 7.215, p < 0.001. A 2 (Patrol Type: Standard
vs. Study-Free) × 2 (Bias: Liberal vs. Conservative) × 2
(Patrol Order: Standard First vs. Study-Free First) ANOVA
on d′-values indicated signiﬁcantly better discrimination in
the standard than in the study-free patrol, F(1,89) = 27.8,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.238, and better discrimination among
participants receiving the standard patrol ﬁrst (M = 0.135) than
among those receiving the study-free patrol ﬁrst (M = 0.065),
F(1,89)= 5.944, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.063. No other signiﬁcant trends
were observed.
Mean criterion shifts are presented as a function of patrol
type and patrol order in Figure 6. As predicted, shifts were
much wider in the study-free patrol than in the standard patrol,
though the order of the two patrols was highly inﬂuential.
When the study-free recognition task came ﬁrst, shifting was
similar across the two patrol types; when the standard patrol
came ﬁrst, shifting was approximately three times greater in the
study-free patrol. A Type × Order ANOVA conﬁrmed these
trends, revealing a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of type, F(1,89) = 19.3,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.178, and a signiﬁcant Type×Order interaction,
F(1,89) = 14.2, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.137. Because patterns of
criterion placement depended critically on the order of the tasks,
we report critical error data separately for the study-free-ﬁrst and
standard-ﬁrst groups.
FIGURE 6 | Mean criterion shifts in the standard and study-free patrol
tasks in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the SEM.
Critical misses and false alarms are depicted in Figure 7.When
participants completed the study-free patrol ﬁrst, critical false
alarms were signiﬁcantly lower in the study-free patrol than in the
standard patrol, t(41) = 5.221, p < 0.001, but critical misses were
signiﬁcantly higher, t(41) = 4.514, p < 0.001. When the standard
patrol came ﬁrst, both critical misses and critical false alarms were
reduced in the study-free patrol. The diﬀerence in false alarms
was signiﬁcant, t(48) = 3.158, p < 0.01, while the diﬀerence in
misses approached but did not reach signiﬁcance, t(48) = 1.844,
p = 0.07.
Participants receiving the study-free patrol ﬁrst were
apparently reluctant to call individuals suspicious in that
patrol, resulting in a high critical miss rate that rendered the
mean criterion shift roughly equal to that of the standard
patrol. In all other respects, the results of Experiment 3 reﬂect
reduced critical error rates in the study-free patrol. These
results support the hypothesis that criterion ﬂexibility in
recognition memory tasks is constrained by overreliance on
memory evidence; when the possibility of drawing on such
evidence was removed, participants increased the magnitude of
shifts.
Even in the study-free patrol, however, knowledge of the
proper bias was by no means the only basis for judgments:
critical miss and false alarm rates were no lower than 0.32
and 0.24, respectively. These results are consonant with those
TABLE 3 | Mean d′ and criterion values in liberal and conservative blocks, Experiment 3.
d′conservative d′ liberal cconservative cliberal
M CI95% M CI95% M CI95% M CI95%
Standard patrol first
Standard patrol 0.19 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.33 0.11 −0.22 0.14
Study-free patrol 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.93 0.28 −0.73 0.37
Study-free patrol first
Standard patrol 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.36 0.19 −0.40 0.15
Study-free patrol 0.01 0.09 −0.08 0.10 0.86 0.21 0.01 0.26
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FIGURE 7 | Critical misses (top) and false alarms (bottom) in the standard and study-free patrol tasks in Experiment 3. Error bars represent the SEM.
of the no-memory condition of Healy and Kubovy (1978),
and indicate that some other form(s) of information were
frequently used to determine suspicious-innocent status. Given
that memory evidence was unavailable and that participants
were explicitly told to avoid basing responses on perceptual
attributes of the stimuli, it is unclear how decisions against
the prevailing bias were made in such cases. Informal
conversations with participants at debrieﬁng, however, suggested
that many participants based judgments on perceptual stimulus
attributes despite knowing that the instructions had told
them otherwise. These participants sometimes reported needing
some basis for their decisions, even when they had been
told that would not lead to correct decisions, because they
had “nothing else to go on.” Based on the results of
Experiment 3, an interim conclusion is that participants in
a recognition task rely on a combination of mnemonic and
non-mnemonic sources of decision evidence when memory
evidence is at least ostensibly available. When no form of
memory evidence is available, as in the study-free patrol,
participants continue to rely on non-mnemonic varieties of
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“evidence,” even when such evidence contains no deﬁnable
signal.
Removal of the study phase in the study-free patrol did
not inﬂuence all participants equally, however. Figure 8
displays criterion shifting for each participant in the standard
and study-free patrols, ordered from the smallest shift for
a given patrol on the left to the largest shift on the right.
For example, the ﬁrst pair of bars on the left represents
the smallest shift by a participant in the standard patrol
followed by the smallest shift by a participant in the study-
free patrol; the nth pair of bars represents the nth largest
shift in each task (note that shifts are ordered independently
for the standard and study-free patrols, such that a given
pair of bars represents the same shifting rank for each patrol
type, but not necessarily the same participant). This plot
illustrates a critical distinction between performance on the two
patrol types: while broad individual diﬀerences characterized
shifting on both tasks, many more individuals shifted at or
near the maximum level (corresponding to a value of 4.91 in
the present experiment) in the study-free patrol than in the
standard patrol. Strikingly, 16 participants minimized critical
misses, critical false alarms, or both in the study-free patrol;
only two did so in the standard patrol. Removing memory
evidence, then, induced many more participants to adopt an
extreme criterion. Of the 16 participants eliminating critical
errors in the study-free patrol, 13 had received the standard
patrol ﬁrst, suggesting that having experience with a standard
study-test cycle ﬁrst made the loss of the study phase in
the study-free patrol more salient, provoking participants to
abandon any attempt to utilize decision evidence. These results
demonstrate that a strategy of disregarding faulty decision
evidence is not beyond the means of individuals; rather,
some individuals do indeed execute such shifts, while most
do not.
General Discussion
Criterion shifting in recognition memory tasks is generally
inadequate, resulting in lost potential for correct responses. We
tested the hypothesis, originally advanced by Green and Swets
(1966), that this conservatism in criterion placement is driven in
part by an overreliance on decision evidence. In order to gauge
the potential for participants to disregard ambiguous decision
evidence and defer to simple decision rules following from a
criterion manipulation, we created a recognition paradigm in
which participants had little or no recourse to memory and
compelling consequences for critical errors. Criterion shifting
under these conditions was insuﬃcient to avoid striking rates of
critical errors. In Experiment 1, shifting was no greater in the
patrol task than in a standard target probability manipulation,
and mean critical error rates were no lower than 25% even
with trial-by-trial feedback admonishing participants for such
errors. In Experiment 2, a payoﬀ task with a personal ﬁnancial
consequence for critical errors yielded performance similar to
that of the patrol and percent tasks. Even the removal of the study
phase from the patrol task in Experiment 3 did not dissuade most
participants from relying, in part, on information they knew was
not diagnostic of target status. These ﬁndings suggest that most
participants will use any information at hand to try and arrive
at the correct response before they will resign themselves to a
heavy reliance on a clear and adaptive decision rule, even when
the evidence is transparently devoid of value.
Researchers have advanced several hypotheses regarding the
basis of this limitation. These include the over/underestimation
of target base rates (Ulehla, 1966), a strategy of distributing “old”
and “new” responses according to the base rates (i.e., “probability
matching;” Thomas and Legge, 1970), incorrect intuition as
to the shape of the target and lure evidence distributions
(Kubovy, 1977), and a noisy, rather than static, decision criterion
FIGURE 8 | Criterion shifts for each participant in the standard and study-free patrol tasks in Experiment 3. In each task, the maximum shift possible
was 4.91.
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(Benjamin et al., 2009). Although any of these factors may
have inﬂuenced performance in the present experiments, we
do not believe that they provide a compelling account of the
results. First, target base rates were not manipulated in the Patrol
(Experiments 1–3) and Payoﬀ (Experiment 2) tasks, yet critical
error rates were as high in these conditions as in the Percent
task. These ﬁndings suggest that limits on criterion shifting are
not driven by a failure to estimate or an attempt to match base
rates (and estimation of the base rates was not necessary even
in the Percent task). Participants could have detected and tried
to match the base rates in the Patrol and Payoﬀ tasks, but these
base rates were even (except in the Experiment 1 Patrol task)
and thus had no diagnostic value. Second, participants’ ability
to estimate the shape of the evidence distributions would not
have been a factor in the study-free Patrol task (i.e., there was no
memory evidence in that task), yet most participants committed
high rates of critical errors. Third, trial-by-trial variability in
criterion placement has been shown to predict suboptimal
shifting (Benjamin et al., 2009), but it seems unlikely that such
noise would have been so great as to account for the frequency of
critical errors observed in the present experiments. In addition, a
criterion noise account would not explain why some participants
did completely avoid critical errors, particularly in the study-free
patrol (see Figure 8). Finally, in the “utilized” signal detection
model of optimal criterion placement advanced by Lynn and
Barrett (2014), suboptimality is driven by inaccurate estimates
of base rates, payoﬀs, and/or target-lure similarity. However, our
data indicate that, even jointly, these factors cannot completely
account for participants’ criterion placement. Base rates and
payoﬀs did not need to be estimated in the present experiments,
and target-lure similarity was irrelevant in Experiment 3, yetmost
participants’ criteria did not nearly minimize critical errors or
maximize payoﬀs.
Instead, our results support the hypothesis that most
participants under-shift because they over-interpret decision
evidence: apparently, people would rather attempt to be correct
than be correctly biased. The present results demonstrate that
even when participants are aware that the signal is eﬀectively
non-existent, context-based criterion shifts are under-utilized.
We speculate that people would rather try their best to generate
responses using their own sense of signal strength than simply
adopt a decision rule that, in the present experiments, could
have ensured their total avoidance of critical errors. With an
encoding phase to draw upon (as in nearly all recognition
memory experiments), participants tend to over-rely on memory
evidence as the source of that signal, but even in the absence of
memory evidence participants will pursue some endogenously
derived “signal” as a basis for judgments. Thus, as Green
and Swets (1966) described, participants refuse to “turn their
backs” on the visual signal and defer to context-appropriate
bias. Such an account would explain why shifting in the
Percent task was at least equal to that in the Payoﬀ and Patrol
tasks despite lacking the motivators inherent to those tasks.
In the Percent condition, the base rates provided a basis for
guessing the correct answer; in this condition only, being correct
and being correctly biased were one and the same. In the
Patrol condition, by contrast, even a rebuke following a critical
false alarm did not provide diagnostic information that the
participant could use to discern probe status on subsequent
trials.
Because most participants in Experiment 3 failed to use
extreme response criteria whether or not they participated
in a study session prior to test, we proposed that they
based a substantial portion of their judgments on forms of
evidence orthogonal to the task, such as perceptual stimulus
characteristics like skin color, clothing, and gender (even
though they were informed that these features were balanced
across suspicious and innocent individuals). This notion may
seem at odds with a signal detection theory characterization
of recognition memory, which includes a unidimensional
(mnemonic) evidence axis. Indeed, most models of recognition
memory incorporate this unidimensional evidence assumption
and are not equipped to describe performance in the near-zero
d′ scenarios tested here. However, the dynamics of decision
making under these circumstances might be described by
such models with an extension to a multidimensional signal
detection framework (Ashby and Soto, 2015). Multidimensional
signal detection theory can be applied to situations in which
stimuli may be judged according to more than one dimension,
and it is often used with perceptual classiﬁcation tasks
in which two stimulus features jointly determine category
membership.
We illustrate how this framework might be applied to
recognition decisions under ambiguous (or absent) memory
evidence in Figure 9, using the conservative, study-free security
patrol paradigm from Experiment 3 as an example. In this
patrol, subjects are instructed to avoid false alarms at all costs;
between these instructions and the absence of memory evidence,
the most appropriate response is to say “innocent” on every
trial, yet most subjects’ false alarm rates were still quite high.
Figure 9 depicts three possible explanations for this behavior
within a multidimensional signal detection framework. For
simplicity, each scenario assumes that recognition decisions can
be made according to a test probe’s position on a memory
(familiarity) evidence axis or a perceptual (skin color) evidence
axis; however, in practice any number of dimensions may
become relevant for classifying a probe as recognized. Panel
A depicts the use of familiarity as a basis for judgments in
the study-free patrol. Without a study session, there is clearly
no memory or familiarity signal relevant to the recognition
decision. However, even novel items will carry some familiarity
based on extra-experimental associations and encounters with
previous test items. Given that subjects were instructed to make
a memory judgment even with no prior study session, they
may still have felt compelled to make a judgment according
to the familiarity dimension. Alternatively, subjects may have
ignored the instructions not to make a judgment on the basis
of a perceptual characteristic (Panel B). The use of skin color
as a basis for determining whether or not a test item was a
suspicious individual could also lead to a high proportion of false
alarms. Finally, subjects may have been using more than one
dimension to decide (Panel C). For example, subjects may have
responded “suspicious” if the test ﬁgure seemed familiar despite
the lack of a study session or if the skin color was dark enough
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FIGURE 9 | Illustration of decision making in Experiment 3, study-free security patrol, from a multidimensional signal detection theory
perspective. Dashed lines represent noise distributions; solid lines represent signal distributions. (A) Test probes are called “suspicious” if their familiarity
exceeds a criterial level. (B) Test probes are called “suspicious” if the darkness of their skin exceeds a criterial level. (C) Either familiarity or skin color may be
used to make judgments.
to surpass a criterion along that dimension. As noted above, any
number of dimensions not depicted may also have been used by
subjects. The use of any such dimensions as an alternative to an
appropriate decision criterion will lead to an increase in critical
errors.
While the group average criterion shifts in the present
experiments indicate a general limit on criterion ﬂexibility,
shifting was marked by broad inter-individual variability. While
we displayed this variability only for Experiment 3 (see Figure 8),
it was robust in each experiment: across the 468 tests completed
by participants in Experiment 2, for example, shifting ranged
from maximal (c > 3.5, N = 22) to minimal (c < 0.10,
N = 46). Such variability raises intriguing questions as to
the factors that led some participants to shift widely and
others minimally. In Experiment 3, for example, 18 participants
achieved either critical miss or critical false alarm rates close
to 0 – what led this subset of participants to set aside decision
evidence as a basis for judgments while most relied on it? The
results of Experiment 3 indicate that two aspects of the task
drove many of these participants to use maximal criteria. First,
16 of the 18 cases occurred in the study-free recognition test,
suggesting that removing the possibility of memory evidence
is enough to convince some participants to there is no basis
for judgment beyond context. Second, 13 of the 16 study-
free cases occurred when a complete study-test patrol cycle
preceded the study-free patrol. This ﬁnding indicates that
individuals are more likely to respond appropriately in a zero-
evidence scenario if they have had experience with a version
of the task in which decision evidence (however faulty) was
available.
The question remains, however, as to why these elements
of the task induced some participants and not others to adopt
extreme criteria. One possibility is that stable individual
diﬀerences underlie shifting tendencies. Aminoﬀ et al.
(2012) demonstrated wide variability in criterion shifting
and considered willingness to shift criterion as a latent variable
(see also Kantner and Lindsay, 2012, 2014). Aminoﬀ et al. (2012)
examined a number of personality characteristics that seemed
to mediate such willingness, including the BAS Fun Seeking
subscale (Carver and White, 1994). Future eﬀorts to identify the
cognitive and personality correlates of criterion ﬂexibility could
help reveal the basis of individual diﬀerences in adaptive shifting
behavior.
Our initial hypothesis was that the security patrol scenario
would in eﬀect restrict the range of individual diﬀerences
observed in shifting by compelling participants to adopt extreme
response criteria. This hypothesis was disconﬁrmed, suggesting
a deep resistance to using extreme criteria. However, these
results do not rule out the possibility of a more eﬀective
security patrol that could overcome this resistance. For example,
participants in the present experiments were not informed of the
reason studied individuals were considered suspicious. While the
instructions in the liberal and conservative conditions implied
serious consequences for critical errors, reference to a speciﬁc
crime (e.g., murder) might invest participants more fully in
avoiding those errors. Perhaps more signiﬁcantly, the security
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patrol was framed instructionally as a test of memory (this
was less the case in the study-free patrol, but instructions in
that task mentioned that memory would have been part of the
decision process had the study phase been possible). People
might simply be unwilling or unable to limit their use of
memory under task demands that emphasize recognition. Indeed,
such a predisposition would be adaptive as long as memory
evidence carried some diagnostic value, and may be diﬃcult
to “turn oﬀ” in the relatively rare cases where it does not.
A security patrol paradigm that emphasizes decision making
at test (rather than recognition per se) and that characterizes
memory as one source of information toward that end (rather
than an end goal in itself) might engendermore eﬀective criterion
placement.
Conclusion
We note that while participants often appear to utilize highly
dubious forms of decision evidence in service of recognition
judgments, adaptive criterion shifting was by no means absent
in the present experiments. Shifting was, in fact, substantial in
every condition of the present experiments, reducing critical
errors in the Patrol and Payoﬀ tasks below chance levels even
though old–new discrimination was at chance. In Experiment 2,
the Percent task with feedback yielded an overall percent correct
of 64%; based on discrimination alone, it would have been close
to 50%. Thus, these results point to the value of criterion shifting
in improving decision making, and of further investigation into
the locus of shifting tendencies, especially as a cognitive aid
for memory-impaired populations (e.g., Beth et al., 2009). At
the same time, they demonstrate a psychological basis for a
ceiling on human ﬂexibility in decision strategies: the desire
to arrive at one’s own conclusion, however inconclusive the
evidence.
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